Deaths of Despair (DoD), or mortality resulting from suicide, drug overdose, and alcohol-related liver disease, have been rising steadily in the United States over the last several decades. In 2020, a record 186,763 annual despair-related deaths were documented, contributing to the longest sustained decline in US life expectancy since 1915–1918. This forum feature considers how health humanities disciplines might fruitfully engage with this era-defining public health catastrophe and help society better understand and respond to the crisis.

Canada has a marked shortfall between the supply and demand for kidneys for transplantation. Median wait times for deceased donor kidney transplantation vary from 5.8 years in British Columbia, 5.2 years in Manitoba and 4.5 years in Ontario to a little over 2 years in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Living donation provides a viable option for some, but not all people. Consequently, a small number of people travel abroad to undergo kidney transplantation by commercial means. The extent to which they (...) are aware of the potential risks to their health and the health of the kidney vendors is unclear. Travel abroad to obtain a kidney commercially i.e. transplant tourism (TT), raises ethical issues which include the exploitation of the poor, uncertainty of donor informed consent to nephrectomy, poor clinical care and lack of follow up for the donor, commodification of the body and inequity of access to medical care for donors. Also, TT widens socioeconomic disparities in access to transplantation, differing from the Canadian system of universal coverage for healthcare. The Canadian transplant community has discussed how to respond to patients who plan to travel abroad for TT or return with a purchased kidney. Unease rests in the tension between the duty to care for legitimate Canadian residents and the unwillingness to enable TT. This paper discusses three anonymized cases and the Canadian responses to TT as recorded in academic literature and a formal statement by relevant professional bodies. (shrink)

The main goal of this study was to identify factors motivating pragmatic transfer in advanced learners of English. Based on a cross-cultural comparison of requesting behavior between Koreans and Americans, this study determined the impact of individual subjective motives on pragmatic language choice. Two different groups of subjects participated in this study: 30 Korean participants and 30 American college students. Data were collected by using a Discourse Completion Task. Korean participants provided the data for Korean and English versions of DCT. (...) Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with 13 Korean ESL learners who showed the most and least amount of pragmatic transfer. Findings showed evidence of pragmatic transfer in the request responses given by Korean ESL learners in their requestive strategies, level of directness, and perspectives of head acts. The interview data revealed that Korean students were conscious of differing rules for making requests. Learners’ judgment of L2 pragmatic norms, perception of their own language, and their attitudes of the target language influence language use. Furthermore, findings showed that purpose of learning English, different types of motivation, and the length of intended residence contribute to the extent of pragmatic transfer. (shrink)

It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones.

Hypocretin regulates brain reward function and cocaine consumption in rats. The hypocretinergic (Hcrt) system is implicated in energy homeostasis, feeding and sleep regulation. Hypocretinergic cell bodies are located in the lateral hypothalamus (LH) and project throughout the brain. The aim of the present studies was to investigate the role of the Hcrt system in regulating brain reward function and the reinforcing properties of cocaine in rats. Intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) thresholds provide an accurate measure of brain reward function in rats. Here (...) we show that a single injection of Hcrt-1 (5 µg icv) induced persistent, long-lasting elevations in ICSS thresholds in drug-naïve rats. Indeed, Hrct-1 elevated ICSS thresholds for 36 h, with peak elevations between 6 and 12 hours after injection. Hrct-1-induced threshold elevations were attenuated by an antibody known to neutralize the binding of hcrt-1 to its receptors. Taken together, these observations suggest that Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function in rats. Because Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function, we hypothesized that it may attenuate the increased brain reward function usually observed after cocaine consumption, and thereby alter cocaine self-administration behavior. A daily injection of Hrct-1 (1 µg icv), for 4 consecutive days, slightly increased cocaine self-administration (0.25 mg/infusion) in rats. Overall, these data demonstrate that Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function, and as such may indirectly alter cocaine self-administration. Given the well-established role of hypocretin neurons in regulating feeding behavior and sleep, we hypothesize that hypocretinergic regulation of brain reward function may provide a mechanism by which appropriate and competing behaviors (e.g. sleep or feeding) may be engaged to maintain energy homeostasis. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)

Von Wright describes his position as "teleological" yet distinguishes it from Aristotle's "notion of the good of man relative to a notion of the nature of man," by likening it to that of the utilitarian tradition. There is painstaking attention to the staggering diversity of functions of "good" and related words, and an examination of instrumental, technical, medical, hedonic and utilitarian goodness. Von Wright regards the moral sense of "good" as derivative and defines it in terms of the (...) beneficial, a sub-class of Utilitarian Goodness. Chapters on Virtue, "Good" and "Must," Duty, Justice are included. There are rather few references to other works, very many distinctions, and an Index which includes, among others, the word "all right."--R. L. M. (shrink)

Let N, O and S denote the set of nonnegative integers, the graph of the constant 0 function and the graph of the successor function respectively. For sets $P, Q, R \subseteq N^2$ operations of transposition, composition, and bracketing are defined as follows: $P^\cup = \{\langle x, y\rangle | \langle y, x\rangle \epsilon P\}, PQ = \{\langle x, z\rangle| \exists y\langle x, y\rangle \epsilon P & \langle y, z\rangle \epsilon Q\}$ , and [ P, Q, R] = ∪n ε M(PnQR (...) n). THEOREM. The class of recursively enumerable subsets of N2 is the smallest class of sets with O and S as members and closed under transposition, composition, and bracketing. This result is derived from a characterization by Julia Robinson of the class of general recursive functions of one variable in terms of function composition and "definition by general recursion." A key step in the proof is to show that if a function F is defined by general recursion from functions A, M, P and R then F = [ P∪, A∪ M, R]. The above definitions of the transposition, composition, and bracketing operations on subsets of N2 can be generalized to subsets of X2 for an arbitrary set X. In this abstract setting it is possible to show that the bracket operation can be defined in terms of K, L, transposition, composition, intersection, and reflexive transitive closure where K: X → X and L: X → X are functions for decoding pairs. (shrink)

Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years (...) by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie’s error theory can’t be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin’s. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self-refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.1 (2000) 153-156 [Access article in PDF] JHI 2000 Donald R. Kelley It was just sixty years ago that this Journal first made its appearance. Two hundred thirty-nine issues later it continues in a world transformed by war, overpopulation, cultural shocks, scientific and technological transformations, globalization, the avalanche of information produced by electronic exchange, and "the acceleration of just about everything." Yet despite (...) these factors and the strains of postmodernism and cultural alterity, 1 it has not entirely lost touch with its intellectual innocence, faith in humanistic learning, and reliance on enlightened reason. This continuity itself may seem something of a novelty in an age of distrust of history and "rage against reason," but for some of us it reflects the critical spirit and intellectual context out of which such ostensibly subversive attitudes emerge, and reemerge. To some extent, moreover, the diversity of opinions about intellectual traditions is the result of specializations, and special interests, which have changed the climate of opinion since the time of Arthur O. Lovejoy, principal founder of the JHI. Lovejoy's vision was super- as well as inter-disciplinary; that is, he intended to include in the agenda of "history of ideas" particular areas of history of philosophy, literature, art, science, social science, etc., as well as the larger intellectual and cultural areas into which these disciplinary histories extend. 2 These days, however, all these disciplinary traditions have their own more specialized journals and do not need to seek a vehicle in publications of more general interest. What remains then, for the most part, is the interdisciplinary arena in which larger questions of human experience should be posed--and for Lovejoy, as for so many epigones and critics, the main "larger question" is not only one of value but also of specifically historical inquiry. 3 [End Page 153]The first issue of the JHI appeared under the editorship of Lovejoy (with Philip Wiener, who did most of the editorial work, as "managing editor"), assisted by a committee that included two historians, three philosophers, four literary scholars, and one political theorist; namely, Crane Brinton, Gilbert Chinard, Morris Cohen, Francis Coker, Richard McKeon, Perry Miller, Marjory Nicolson, J. H. Randall, J. Salwyn Schapiro, and Louis Wright. The first volume featured contributions from each of these, including Wiener, except for Miller (vol. 2), Shapiro (vol. 3), McKeon (vol. 8), and Coker. 4 During the first five years there were also reviews of books by Dilthey (by Horace L. Friess), Croce (Schapiro), Mannheim (Randall), Perry Miller (Herbert W. Schneider), Van Wyck Brooks (Miller) and Alfred Kazin (F. O. Matthiessen). In this period the disciplinary distribution of articles was not markedly different from that of the past five years, nor was the ranking of fields by number of submissions. 5 Most important, the original interdisciplinary thrust of Lovejoy's agenda, if not his attachment to the spiritualist currency of "unit-ideas," has survived growing specialization.At first the history of ideas was pursued largely in the shadow of the history of philosophy; for in this field, according to Lovejoy, "is to be found the common seed-plot, the locus of initial manifestation in writing, of the greater number of the more fundamental and pervasive ideas, and especially of the ruling preconceptions, which manifest themselves in other regions of intellectual history." 6 Lovejoy's concern was always with concepts, especially "-isms," and yet in some ways he anticipated the "linguistic turn" of the later years of this century, pointing out in particular "the role of semantic shifts, ambiguities, and confusions, in the history of thought and taste," for "nearly all of the great catchwords have been equivocal--or rather, multivocal." 7 If ideas could be given stable definitions, they were nonetheless often, in the context of language, in conflict, even in the mind of a single thinker; for such was the "anomaly of knowledge." 8 So Lovejoy was at pains to distinguish the various meanings of [End Page 154] catch-words like "nature," "perfectibility," "romanticism," "progress," and "pragmatism," not to mention more inflammatory terms of wartime ideological debate.But... (shrink)

Philosophers of experiment have acknowledged that experiments are often more than mere hypothesis-tests, once thought to be an experiment's exclusive calling. Drawing on examples from contemporary biology, I make an additional amendment to our understanding of experiment by examining the way that `wide' instrumentation can, for reasons of efficiency, lead scientists away from traditional hypothesis-directed methods of experimentation and towards exploratory methods.

Philosophical discussions of species have focused on multicellular, sexual animals and have often neglected to consider unicellular organisms like bacteria. This article begins to fill this gap by considering what species concepts, if any, apply neatly to the bacterial world. First, I argue that the biological species concept cannot be applied to bacteria because of the variable rates of genetic transfer between populations, depending in part on which gene type is prioritized. Second, I present a critique of phylogenetic bacterial species, (...) arguing that phylogenetic bacterial classification requires a questionable metaphysical commitment to the existence of essential genes. I conclude by considering how microbiologists have dealt with these biological complexities by using more pragmatic and not exclusively evolutionary accounts of species. I argue that this pragmatism is not borne of laziness but rather of the substantial conceptual problems in classifying bacteria based on any evolutionary standard. (shrink)

By deepening Austin’s reflections on the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts, Frederick L. Will defends an ‘externalist’ account of mental content: as human beings we could not think, were we not in fact cognizant of a natural world structured by events and objects with identifiable and repeatable similarities and differences. I explicate and defend Will’s insight by developing a parallel critique of Kant’s and Carnap’s rejections of realism, both of whom cannot account properly for the content of experience. This critique (...) shows that Will has identified a genuinely transcendental basis for defending common-sense realism, without appeal to any high-level theory of knowledge. I then show how Will’s realism undercuts Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism, Michael Williams’ partial defense of skepticism, John Haldane’s attempt to rehabilitate Aquinas’ account of concepts, and how it augments Crispin Wright’s defense of realism. (shrink)

Many of the papers in this volume originated in a colloquium at the University of Western Ontario in 1967. These include a paper on the logic of norms by G. H. Von Wright, a paper on the logic of questions by L. Åqvist, a paper on the logic of belief by W. Sellars, and a paper on inductive logic by R. Ackermann. The commentaries by Anderson and Sosa have been revised for the volume and a further commentary to Ackermann's (...) paper by Wesley Salmon has been added. In addition to the colloquium papers a number of further papers are published here for the first time: J. Hintikka on the semantics of propositional attitudes, R. Hilpinen on relativized modalities, C. Harrison on the unanticipated examiner and H. Smokler and M. Rohr on confirmation and translation. The volume is completed by two papers published in Synthese and a well-known paper in modal logic by Lemmon, Meredith, Meredith, Prior, and Thomas published complete with a new postscript by Prior. Although the collection is somewhat haphazard and seems to have no unifying theme, philosophers interested in these topics in philosophical logic will be thankful for the availability of the papers, both old and new.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:98 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY quoted in great numbers. The other is Kern's philosophical competence and his skill in handling complex problems. The book is divided into two parts. Part I gives the reader a brief historical survey of Husserl's changing attitudes toward Kant and the neo-Kantians (especially Natorp and ttickert). Indicating the influences which shaped Husserl's thinking during the years of his studies at the universities of Berlin and (...) Vienna, Kern traces Husserl's development throughout his career as a thinker and a writer. But this survey (pp. 1-50) provides merely the general framework within which the intensive and detailed analyses of Part II (pp. 51-424) must be viewed. Two appendices, an extensive bibliography, and a name index complete the work. The detailed discussions of Part II are, of course, the really important contributions to our understanding of Husserl's relation to Kant and the Kantians. As was to be expected, Husserl found in Kant's works formulations of problems and profound insights that he regarded as crucial to any philosophy. At times, however, Husserl was sure that because of mistaken assumptions, insufficiently clarified presuppositions, and methodological deficiencies Kant himself had not fully realized his intentions. Still, it is evident that, in time, Husserl found himself increasingly in sympathy with Kant's postion. In fact, in the end he used Kant's term "transcendental idealism" to designate his own philosophy. In the course of this development, however, Husserl's thinking underwent various changes and reversals. The detailed analyses of them make fascinating reading and are most revelatory of Husserl's own struggles with obtrnsive problems. In Chapter z of Part II (pp. 55-134), the author discusses Husserl's criticism of Kant's positionwKant's conception of the apriori, his strict separation of "sensibility" and "understanding," his presupposition of a "natural world view," his failure to ask sufficiently radical questions concerning the foundations of knowledge, his lack of a proper method of analysis, and his "psychologism." In the course of his own development, however, Husserl modified and, in some respects, even reversed his criticisms of Kant. Chapters ~, m, re and v of Part II, dealing with problems of formal and transcendental logic, with the possibihty of metaphysics on Kantian principles, and with the complex problems of subjectivity, bear witness to the fact that Huseerl often changed his opinion of Kant's work. Of special interest, however, is Chapter vz. It is devoted to a comparison of Husserl's and Kant's "transcendental idealism" and reveals most strikingly the similarities of the two positions. The chapter dealing with Husserl's relation to l~atorp and Rickert, interesting in its own way, is essentially only a footnote, as it were, to the rest of the hook; but it completes the survey. As I said before, this book gives us not only a remarkable insight into the various phases of development in Husserl's thinking and is therefore indispensable to a real understanding of Husserl's intentions and achievements; it also lets us see Kant's philosophy in a new and revealing perspective--both as to its value and it deficiencies. Only a detailed study can do justice to this book. W. H. WF~mMF~STZR Florida State University Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zettel. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. (University of California Press and Basil Blackwell, 1967. Pp. v + 124 [German and English on facing pages]. $6.95.) The paragraphs in this volume, the editors tell us, were collected in a box-file by Wittgenstein from a period beginning in 1929,though the bulk of them come from typescripts dictated between 1945 and 1948. The editors credit Peter Geach with the major work of arrangement. Whoever is responsible did a superlative job, a remark that holds as well for Miss Anscombe's translation. The editors and Mr. Geach have performed an invaluable service to those interested BOOK REVIEWS 99 in Wittgenstein and--quite apart from Wittgensteinian exegesis--in the problems treated in these pages. The philosophical topics are those of the Investigations (PI) and The Remarks on the Foundations o] Mathematir~ (RFM)---e.g., the attack on... (shrink)

In this commentary, we set out the specifics of how Glowacki's game theoretical framework for the evolution of peace could be incorporated within broader cultural evolutionary approaches. We outline a formal proposal for prisoner's dilemma games investigating raid-based conflict. We also centre an ethnographic lens to understand the norms surrounding war and peace in intergroup interactions in small-scale communities.